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RICHARD AXELBY
 
This article examines the effects of state intervention on the workings of
informal institutions that coordinate the communal use and management of
natural resources. Speciﬁcally it focuses on the case of the nomadic Gaddi
shepherds and ofﬁcial attempts to regulate their access to grazing pastures in
the Indian Himalayas. It is often predicted that the increased presence of the
modern state critically undermines locally appropriate and community-based
resource management arrangements. Drawing on the work of Pauline Peters
and Francis Cleaver, I identify key instances of socially embedded ‘common’
management institutions and explain the evolution of these arrangements
through dynamic interactions between individuals, communities and the
agents of the state. Through describing the ‘living space’ of Gaddi shepherds
across the annual cycle of nomadic migration with their ﬂocks I explore the
ways in which they have been able to creatively reinterpret external interven-
tions, and suggest how contemporary arrangements for accessing pasture at
different moments of the annual cycle involve complex combinations of the
formal and the informal, the ‘traditional’ and the ‘modern’.
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INTRODUCING THE COMMONS
A signiﬁcant strand of the academic analysis of property regimes
 
1
 
 concerns itself
with identifying the characteristics of long-enduring systems of common
resource ownership and management (see, among others, McCay and Acheson
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Contemporary interest in Common Property Resources (CPRs) was provoked by Garrett Har-
din’s 1968 paper on ‘the tragedy of the commons’. Though initially inﬂuential, Hardin’s view that
an absence of individual deﬁned ownership inevitably leads to ruin was, by the 1980s, subject to
considerable attack. Critics of Hardin recognized that, under certain circumstances, collective own-
ership or management can be as effective as private or state ownership in promoting efﬁcient and
sustainable resource use.
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1987; Wade 1988; Bromley and Cernea 1989; Ostrom 1990; Arnold and Stewart
1991; Baland and Platteau 1996). Reviewing these works, Agrawal (2002) helpfully
summarizes the key features recognized in examples of successful cooperative
resource management. Of these ‘design principles’ for institutional sustainability,
it is generally agreed that the resource itself should be clearly deﬁned and the user
group small in size, have recognizable borders, shared norms and homogeneity
of identity and interests. Resource users should additionally possess the ability
to communicate, enjoy a degree of mutual trust and hold the expectation of a
shared future. Moving from the resource users themselves to the wider contexts
in which they operate, it is suggested that common property institutions require
a high degree of stability and an absence of external intervention. Wade (1988)
and Ostrom (1990) both explicitly state that central governments should not
undermine local authority, while Baland and Platteau (1996) suggest that exter-
nal sanctioning institutions must be ‘supportive’.
 
2
 
 The conclusion of such obser-
vations is that communal systems for regulating common-pool resources are
only found in small, stable communities characterized by political and economic
self-sufﬁciency and internal homogeneity. Looking at the examples of robust
and viable commons-type regimes on which these ﬁndings are based, we ﬁnd
many of them are drawn either from historical or ethnographic studies; whether
located in the past or amongst contemporary ‘indigenous’ societies, there is a
presumption that commons type arrangements are vulnerable to demographic
and technological change or to increased subversion by markets and the state.
This conception of the working of common property management institu-
tions ﬁts readily into a telling of Indian history exempliﬁed by the likes of Anil
Agarwal (1986), Chhatrapati Singh (1986), Vandana Shiva (1991), Ramachandra
Guha (Guha and Gadgil 1989; Guha 1994) and Madhav Gadgil (Gadgil and Guha
1992, 1995). Identiﬁed by Sinha et al. (1997) as ‘New Traditionalist Discourse’
and by Greenough (2001) as the ‘Standard Environmental Narrative’, this posi-
tion came to dominate alternative understandings of environmental history in
South Asia.
 
3
 
 At the risk of simpliﬁcation, a picture is painted of a traditional
‘golden age’ of appropriate resource use in which self-governing and relatively
harmonious communities were able to collectively manage natural resources in
a sustainable and appropriate manner.
 
4
 
 We are told how, in the pre-modern past,
common property formed the backbone of India’s economy – a large number of
people, and (as we shall see) particularly nomadic pastoralists, were heavily
dependent on natural resources managed in this manner. This image of ‘village
 
2
 
Wade includes the following as a condition for successful CPR institutions: ‘the less the state can,
or wishes to, undermine locally based authorities, and the less the state can enforce private property
rights effectively, the better the chances of success’ (1988, 216).
 
3
 
For an overview and critique of what Baumann calls the ‘populist position’ (1997) see also Madsen
(1999) and Agrawal and Sivaramakrishnan (2001).
 
4
 
‘It is evident that till the end of the last century and in all historical periods before that at least 80
percent of India’s natural resources were common property, with only about 20 percent being
privately utilized. Given the uncertainty of records, even a ration of 90:10 for common versus private
property would not be an unlikely estimate’ (Singh 2001, 16).
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republics’ acting in concert with local herders assumes effective autonomy from
external political and economic forces (Sinha et al. 1997, 81). But, as CPR theory
suggests, such systems are fragile and vulnerable to external intervention and change.
In the ‘new traditionalist’ telling of Indian environmental history, the early
nineteenth century saw long-standing systems of resource management increas-
ingly undermined by external forces. Among the most obvious effects of
colonial appropriation and administration of India’s natural resources were the
arrangements by which these resources were owned and managed as common
property. According to Guha, over the past century and a half, ecological
imperialism has ‘transformed existing patterns of resource use and initiated
fundamental alterations in the natural environment’ (2000, 216). Following
incorporation into the ‘modern’ relations of emerging world systems, the integrity
of pre-existing systems of natural resources management was critically disrupted
and the social capital they were built upon eroded.
 
5
 
 Seeking certainty in uniformity,
the colonial state acted to petrify indigenous systems that previously had
been characterized by local appropriateness, complexity and ﬂuidity. The drive
to impose simpliﬁed plans readable by the centre resulted in the unvarying
imposition of private and state control. From this perspective the arrival of the
new and exogenous must inevitably undermine the old and indigenous: it seems
the two cannot co-exist in any shape or form.
Even if we accept this notion of the penetration and absorption of local
communities, it would be incorrect to regard this ‘great transformation’ as a
one-way process in which outcomes are uniform and predetermined. Cohn has
written of how the ‘all-India’ legal culture shaped during the period of British
rule and continued since Independence ‘has affected the bulk of the population
in varying ways, but most infrequently in the ways those creating the legal
culture intended’ (1990, 608). Such variation and divergence from intention can
partly be attributed to the modern state being less uniform, less monolithic and
less powerful than is frequently supposed. Law, as Singh points out, is a process
within which what exists (and what does not) is never wholly predetermined;
far from being rigidly deﬁned, there is a large legal space within which ‘inter-
pretation and the invocation of fundamental principles of justice provide fertile
ground for creativity’ (1986, viii). Once we start to view law as a process rather
than an absolute set of rules, it becomes possible to identify ‘living spaces’ within
which local occupancy rights are resurrected and a diverse range of outcomes
may be found. Accepting a degree of contradiction and conﬂict within the modern
state, it is necessary to consider the other side of the equation: the reaction of
local people to change. This article looks at the effects of state intervention on
the contemporary workings of systems of common use and management of
natural resources. Speciﬁcally it focuses on the case of the nomadic Gaddi shep-
herds and ofﬁcial attempts to regulate their access to grazing pastures in the
 
5
 
Breman writes that, as the countryside was opened up, ‘all kinds of supra-local institutions and
agencies entered the scene [thus] depriving the people of any control over their own lifestyle which
was based on mutual co-operation’ (1997, 24).
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Indian Himalayas. In the words of a saying well known to the Gaddis: ‘it takes
two hands to clap’.
THE GADDI SHEPHERDS OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
With a population of approximately 120,000,
 
6
 
 the Gaddi tribe
 
7
 
 inhabit the slopes
of the Dhaula Dhar and Pir Panjal ranges in the Indian State of Himachal
Pradesh.
 
8
 
 The Gaddis are staunch Shaivites, most of whom claim Rajput status,
though Brahmans, Khatris and a number of lower castes are also known. A
typical Gaddi household is engaged in the production of wheat and maize; now-
adays a large proportion of these formerly wholly subsistence crops is sold at
market.
 
9
 
 Owing to the limits on arable farming imposed by the mountainous
terrain,
 
10
 
 a signiﬁcant proportion
 
11
 
 of families also maintain large ﬂocks of sheep
and goats. Practising a form of transhumant
 
12
 
 nomadism, in which they drive
their ﬂocks from winter grazing grounds in the Siwalik scrub forests up to the
alpine pastures of the high Himalayas for the summer months, the shepherds
generate signiﬁcant cash incomes from the sale of meat and wool.
In contrast to the individual ownership of livestock, a frequently occurring
feature of nomadic societies is that rights over migration routes and grazing
grounds are vested in kinship and community groups. In part, communal own-
ership arrangements can be attributed to the sorts of arid, marginal and risky
environments in which nomadic pastoralists operate (Sandford 1983). With graz-
ing resources spread over large areas and high levels of temporal and spatial
variability in biomass production, the cost of individual control of grazing land
is likely to be considerably greater than the beneﬁts derived from it; in such
situations common type arrangements proliferate (see Behnke et al. 1993; Behnke
1994; Scoones 1995). This can be described as the transaction cost argument:
communal ownership works to reduce the time that would be needed to nego-
tiate access with a host of other individual owners, while joint monitoring and
enforcement minimize the costs of ensuring appropriate resource use. Shared
 
6
 
This ﬁgure is for the number of people speaking the Gaddi language according to SIL International
(http://www.ethnologue.com/show_language.asp?code
 
=
 
gbk Accessed March 2006). However, with
deﬁnitions of Gaddi identity complicated by residence and caste, it should not be taken as deﬁnitive.
 
7
 
Gaddis living in Chamba District are accorded Scheduled Tribe status. Moves are underway to
accord the same status to those who inhabit Kangra District.
 
8
 
Though their ‘homeland’ is said to be Bharmour Tehsil, substantial Gaddi populations are also
found in Chamba Tehsil in Chamba District and in Kangra and Palampur Tehsils in Kangra District.
 
9
 
Recent decades have also seen an expansion in horticulture with apple orchards now a source of
employment in Chamba District.
 
10
 
The average terraced ﬁeld in Chamba was described as being ‘no bigger than a billiard table’ in
the 
 
Punjab Gazetteer
 
 (1908).
 
11
 
Around 25 per cent of households have one or more members involved in migratory pastoralism
though this ﬁgure varies considerably by locality (see Axelby 2005).
 
12
 
Transhumant nomadism is based on the seasonal exploitation of different but complementary
ecological and climatic zones. ‘Vertical’ migration allows shepherds to take advantage of variations
in altitude, climate and geography. Through the exploitation of these different niches, practitioners
of transhumance can maintain larger collections of animals than if they remained ﬁxed in one location
throughout the year.
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access arrangements also allow for ﬂexibility of movement and thereby underpin
the risk spreading that is often crucial to survival in marginal environments. By
enabling nomads to adjust spatially and temporally in their migrations, joint access
arrangements represent an excellent way of assuring access to adequate grazing
and thus to share risks and minimize uncertainty. With the beneﬁts of common
ownership thus deﬁned, it is generally assumed that, in pre-colonial times, such
systems would have typiﬁed pasture access arrangements for the Gaddis also.
In descriptions offered by Gadgil and Guha (1992, 174), Bhattacharya (1986,
1995) and Chakravarty-Kaul (1995, 1996a, 1996b, 1997), Gaddi shepherds are
used to exemplify several key characteristics of the ‘new traditionalist’ telling of
Indian history. Bhattacharya describes pastoralists in the pre-colonial Punjab
enjoying ‘a relatively uninhibited movement in their search for pasture, and
unrestricted rights of grazing in grasslands and forests’ (1986, 120). In a
system that was, according to Chakravarty-Kaul, ‘as old as the hills’, communal
arrangements supposedly guaranteed equitable and appropriate resource access to
the different pastoral and agricultural communities of the Punjab Himalayas.
Importantly these arrangements were resolutely ‘local’: Chakravarty-Kaul describes
pre-nineteenth-century transhumance grazing patterns as being ‘relatively
untouched by outside inﬂuences’ (1996b, 1).
Communal systems for managing grazing resources may have been highly
effective in the pre-colonial era, but the institutions that governed access and
monitored use were likely to be fragile and highly vulnerable to change. ‘[A]nything
reducing the authority of communal control or the incentive to remain together
would weaken such institutions and be a threat to the order’ (Chakravarty-Kaul
1996a, 53). Alterations in the conditions or practices of production of either farmers
or pastoralists would disrupt existing arrangements. According to Chakravarty-
Kaul, the expansion of British hegemony over the Punjab had just this effect:
‘thus began the erosion of customary institutions which regulated herding and
agricultural practices in the mountains’ (1996b, 1). Since this time the communal
systems which traditionally governed access to grazing resources have been
steadily undermined by the partition and privatization of common lands carried
out through the colonial settlement reports and enforced by new legal codes.
Bhattacharya describes how, with the growing inﬂuence of the colonial state,
the Gaddis ‘found their access to forests closed, their rights redeﬁned, the rhythms
of their movements controlled, their spatial movement restricted’ (1995, 54).
Age-old systems of reciprocity between different users of grazing commons
were brought to an end with the imposition of an alien set of rules. In the ‘New
Traditionalist’ narrative, conﬂicts over common lands exemplify the confronta-
tion of a traditional past with the powerful trends of modernization: indigenous
arrangements are deﬁned and opposed against externally originating institutions
that demand ‘one size ﬁts all’ private and state management of natural resources.
Chakravarty-Kaul writes of tensions between customary law ‘rooted in natural
ecological systems’ and foreign statute ‘based on a political system’ (1996a, 4).
Land settlement and grazing permits meant that the shepherds’ movement, once
ﬂuid and ﬂexible, was now tightly controlled by externally imposed rules and
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regulations. With the new system of law applied ‘uniformly to all situations and
places’, land use practices are now frequently found to be ‘at variance with local
conditions and much less responsive to regional contingencies’ (Chakravarty-
Kaul 1996a, 101). These new rules and regulations had the effect of literally
curtailing the ‘room for manoeuvre’ upon which the shepherds had traditionally
based their survival: ‘[a]ll along the route their halts and use of the forests
were monitored and sanctioned. Their ﬂexibility was reduced to a minimum’
(Chakravarty-Kaul 1997, 143). With their scope to adjust temporally and
spatially severely constrained, pastoralists like the Gaddis were effectively ‘frozen
in their tracks’ (1997, 134). From this perspective, Gaddi nomadism, like the
systems of common resource management it is based upon, is seen as ill-
equipped for long-term survival.
CONTEMPORARY COMMONS AND WIDER CONTEXTS
In recent years an emerging body of work has pointed to inadequacies in the
‘design principle’ approach to common property management offered by the
likes of Ostrom. It is argued that CPR theory has been developed on the basis
of descriptive research in relatively simple settlings where boundaries and users
can easily be identiﬁed. Analysis of long enduring commons regimes is based on
an underlying conception of a public realm almost entirely independent of the
state
 
13
 
 (Gilmartin 1999, 237). We are left with the idea, also apparent in ‘New
Traditionalist’ historiography, that collective action is either stable and institu-
tionally robust, or it is disappearing, undermined by contextual change. Thus,
in resource institution theory:
collective action tends to be understood as the likely 
 
outcome
 
 when certain
conditions are in place, rather than as a 
 
process
 
 evolving from the interplay
between such conditions, characterizing the resource and its users, and –
something which CPR theory tends to neglect – the contextual or external
factors, and how these are interpreted by resource users. (Ravnborg 2000, 8)
This article presents a detailed case study
 
14
 
 of the migratory cycle of a single
group of Gaddi shepherds.
 
15
 
 By exploring the ways that local people both
 
13
 
The title of Wade’s 
 
Village Republics
 
 (1988) makes this tendency clear.
 
14
 
This article is based on ﬁeldwork conducted in 2002 and 2003. During this time I was able to
accompany the shepherds for large parts of their journey; interviews substituted for direct observa-
tion of those places I was unable to venture. Interviews were conducted in a mixture of Hindi and
the Western Pahari dialects of Chamiali and Gaddiboli; though competent in the former, for the latter
two languages I required the assistance of an interpreter. While this account of the migration is
written in the ethnographic present, I should make it clear that this description is speciﬁc to the
period of ﬁeldwork only.
 
15
 
Several previous works on Gaddi nomadism have adopted this strategy (from Lyall 1874 to
Noble 1987), typically outlining the ecological niches occupied by shepherds moving from the
jungles of the Punjab to the Alpine pastures of Lahoul. However, topography is not the sole deter-
minant of nomadic movement and here I consider the social, political and economic relationships
through which the Gaddis attempt to access grazing land and fodder.
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withstand and creatively re-appropriate external interventions, the following is
intended as a response to Agrawal’s (2002) call that more attention be paid to the
wider contexts within which communal arrangements may survive (see also
Menon and Lele 2003; Steins et al. 2000). An examination of the social, political,
legal and economic determinant of grazing access reveals a range of contempo-
rary property management systems with diverse origins, institutional structures
and workings. Drawing on the work of Pauline Peters and Francis Cleaver,
I identify surviving examples of socially embedded ‘common’ management
institutions and explain the evolution of these arrangements through dynamic
interactions between community, individuals and the state. Doing so questions
accepted notions of community and property and the relationship between state
power and local agency. Exploring the ‘living space’ of the Gaddi shepherds, and
in particular the ways in which they have been able to creatively reinterpret
external interventions, demonstrates the extent to which contemporary access
arrangements involve complex combinations of the formal and the informal and
how they evolve in tandem.
SPRING
 
Baisakh (mid-April to mid-May)
 
Bhensu Ram Chauhan lives in Baal village, a string of eight slate-roofed houses
scattered along a ridge in the Panj La area of the Saal valley. Baal, at an altitude
of over 2000 metres, is located about 12 kilometres north-east of Chamba town
and is a good hour and a half walk from the nearest metalled road. I ﬁrst met
Bhensu Ram in March as he and his younger son Nandlal (25 years old) were
busy ploughing a terraced ﬁeld in preparation for sowing the maize crop. ‘I am
80 years of age but still I work [in the ﬁelds] each day. It is important to keep
working. When I stop work then I will die.’ Bhensu was unable to say exactly
when he started working. Having never gone to school, he started to perform
household tasks at an early age and then to help in the ﬁelds soon after. He recalls
the age at which he became a shepherd:
At 15 I started going to Lahoul each year with our 
 
dhan
 
 [ﬂock] and I did
this for 40 years. My father was a shepherd as was my grandfather before
him. I also had uncles who did this work. We would travel together in a
group. . . . When my father died his sheep and goats were shared between
my brothers and me. I inherited 25 animals but, over time, was able to
increase the number to 160. This I did by keeping plenty of strong males
so that more females could conceive each year. I kept very careful watch
over the mothers during lambing season. The ﬁrst 15 days after being born
is the hardest time. I would carry 10 to 15 newborns in my 
 
chola
 
16
 
 to keep
them warm and hidden.
 
16
 
A thick coat of wool tied at the waist with a rope belt.
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Bhensu married and fathered two sons and a daughter. When he reached the age
of 12, the older boy began accompanying Bhensu on migration for a few months
each year. Three years later this son took to shepherding year round and, since
that time, Bhensu has concerned himself with farming his 10 
 
bigha
 
 (3–5 acres) of
land, growing maize in summer and a small amount of wheat in winter.
Bhensu’s younger son Nandlal and two daughters-in-law also work in the ﬁelds
as well as caring for the family’s two cows and the ten or twelve goats that
remain in the area throughout the year.
Outside the ﬁles of the Forest Department, Des Raj Chauhan is familiar to
most as ‘Deso’.
 
17
 
 By the age of 12 he began accompanying his father Bhensu on
migration for a few months each year. Deso left school at 14 having completed
eighth class and has cared for his family’s ﬂock since that time. Though still
relatively young at 39 years old, Deso’s intelligence and trustworthy reputation
have allowed him to take on the position of 
 
malundi
 
 (ﬂock leader).
 
18
 
Though I learned a lot about him from his father and brother, I was unable
to meet Deso until the Hindi month of 
 
Baisakh
 
 (beginning in the second half of
April), when he returned to Chamba district, having spent the winter in the low
hills. Travelling with Deso along the road that runs over the Dhaula Dhar to
Chamba and up the Saal valley were ﬁve other shepherds and somewhere
between 400 and 450 sheep and goats. At this point it is necessary to give a brief
description of Deso’s companions and outline the composition and ownership
of their combined ﬂock.
 
19
 
 The oldest member of the group, 65-year-old
Nidhia, is Bhensu Ram’s younger brother and therefore Deso’s 
 
chacha
 
 (uncle).
Like his nephew and brother, Nidhia began shepherding at an early age. In
recent years he has chosen not to make the arduous journey up to Lahoul and
now remains at home in Lehta village (close to Baal) during the summer
months. Nidhia’s son, 35-year-old Bir, stays with Deso and the ﬂock through-
out the year. Between them Nidhia and Bir own 80 animals. Prithu, the fourth
shepherd in the group, is from Sarahan village at the northern end of the
Saal valley. Deso, Nidhia and Bir claim Prithu as a relative but are unable to
specify the exact nature of the tie. Either way, Prithu and his 70 sheep and
goats have been travelling with the group for the last 15 years. The junior
shepherds in the group are 22-year-old Mohinder and his 16-year-old brother
Dimu. The brothers’ home village is in Belg, a remote area 10 kilometres to the
east of the Saal valley. Owing to a lack of land and a surfeit of sons, Mohinder
and Dimu’s father, though not a shepherd himself, decided to invest in sheep
and goats eight years ago. With no immediate source of capital and lacking a
grazing permit, the only option was to ﬁnd employment for Mohinder as a 
 
chota
 
17
 
To protect the anonymity of sources the names of all individuals and some locations have been
changed.
 
18
 
The size of his ﬂock plus his grazing permit authorized by the Forest Department also contribute
to Deso’s status.
 
19
 
In fact, throughout the year, the number and identity of the shepherds in each group can vary
considerably. How this works will become clearer over the course of this description.
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puhal
 
20
 
 or hired shepherd. Initially Mohinder travelled under the permit of a 
 
Bad
dhania
 
21
 
 from Bharmour called Balia Ram. For assisting in looking after Balia’s
ﬂock of over 700 animals, Mohinder was given ﬁve sheep each year and pro-
vided with ‘all meals and a pair of shoes’. After four years of working on these
terms, Mohinder decided to leave Balia Ram’s service complaining that he was
often left alone on the high pastures while Balia Ram went to get drunk with his
village friends. Mohinder spent the next two years working for a shepherd called
Vishnu, thereby adding several more animals to his ﬂock. This arrangement
came to an end when Vishnu decided to increase the size of his own ﬂock and
felt he could no longer accommodate Mohinder under the quota limit speciﬁed
on his grazing permit. Since that time Mohinder has travelled with Deso’s group
and has been joined by his younger brother Dimu, who is also working to
establish himself as a shepherd. Mohinder and Dimu add another 40 sheep and
goats to the ﬂock.
Alongside the animals belonging to the six above-mentioned shepherds, the
total ﬂock includes an additional 150–200 animals belonging to Gaddis who are
not active shepherds. Typically a sedentary family will send between 10 and 40
animals, allowing them to retain an interest in livestock as an asset that can
quickly and easily be converted into cash. Most of these additional animals
included in Deso’s ﬂock are owned by Gaddi farmers living in villages around
Baal and Lehta. This also beneﬁts the shepherds who are compensated for taking
on livestock for others. Usually those who are not close family can expect to pay
around 50 rupees per animal plus a share of the wool and possibly one or two
young animals each year.
 
22
 
Along with Deso’s group, the month of 
 
Baisakh
 
 sees the return of 15 other
large ﬂocks to the villages in the southeast end of the Saal valley. The shepherds
who manage these ﬂocks are well known to each other; they largely follow the
same route from winter to summer pastures and, partly by virtue of common
residence, feel a degree of kinship (
 
nyat
 
, 
 
gotra
 
, 
 
al
 
, 
 
dharam bhai
 
23
 
). Bhagtu is a
cousin of Bhensu Ram and from Meloh village; Bhader and Rasalu are from
Agar and own a joint ﬂock of 600 animals; Gimoo is from Mileti, the next
village along from Baal, as is Chenu and his group; Hari Singh is the brother of
Deso’s father-in-law and carries a lot of weight among these shepherds; Pyaro
(18) and Hans (at 85 the oldest of the Panj La shepherds) have less than 50
 
20
 
Typically 
 
chota puhals
 
 (also variously known as 
 
tarnete
 
, 
 
trinair
 
, 
 
toridhar puhal
 
 and 
 
khieng
 
) have
fewer than 40 animals and are employed by owners of big ﬂocks for labour.
 
21
 
Owner of a large ﬂock – above 400–500 animals. Also known as 
 
barapuhals
 
, 
 
numberdhars
 
 and 
 
negis
 
.
 
22
 
These amounts can vary considerably, depending on the relationship between owner and shep-
herd and the degree to which the owner is willing to spend time caring for the ﬂock or provide access
to grazing.
 
23
 
Nyat
 
 are endogamous groups that Gaddis may marry within. Smaller than a caste but larger than
an extended family, a 
 
gotra
 
 forms a kind of corporate group which may share territorial lands and in
which each member is responsible to and for the whole group. As elsewhere, Gaddis marry outside
of their 
 
gotra
 
. 
 
Al
 
 are associations of cooperation and mutual assurance and members are obliged to
provide physical, material, moral and vocal support for one another (Bhasin 1988, 135). 
 
Dharam bhai
 
are religious bonds which, following a ceremony, convert a non-relative into a relative.
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animals, having lost many to disease the previous year; Himpat, Rasalu and
Haroo all, with some minor variations, follow the same migration route.
For a month the shepherds remain close to their home villages, slowly moving
their way up the hillsides towards the higher forested areas. With the winter
wheat crop recently harvested, most ﬁelds are empty and available for grazing.
For the ﬁrst 10 days after arriving, Deso’s ﬂock grazes on agricultural land.
Starting from the banks of the Saal River they gradually climb to the ﬁelds
around Baal and Lehta, where the animals are penned in the ﬁelds of various
friends and relatives.
 
24
 
 As sheep droppings make a good fertilizer, farmers invite
shepherds onto their land. Worried about the dangers of animals trespassing onto
neighbouring ﬁelds with standing crops, landowners often volunteer to watch
over ﬂocks, allowing the shepherds the chance to spend time relaxing at home.
As well as farmers’ ﬁelds, ﬂocks graze at a number of other locations, which
shepherds access through a variety of arrangements. As opposed to a ﬁeld used
for agriculture, 
 
du dhar
 
 is an area of privately owned land that supports grazing
only. Being close to the owner’s residence and relatively small in extent, such
land is easily guarded against encroachment. A further source of grazing is
provided by village pasture land: 
 
charan
 
 or 
 
ghasni
 
25
 
 are areas of ﬂattish land where
cattle can be grazed; in contrast, 
 
faat
 
 describes steeply sloped ground unsuited to
large animals or cultivation but suitable for grazing sheep and goats.
With most non-agricultural land in Chamba under the formal ownership of
the Forest Department, ofﬁcially it can only be used by certain people for limited
purposes. Traditional rights to graze or cut grass for fodder are restricted to
particular families and village communities. However, enforcement of such reg-
ulations is generally weak and rules are subject to widespread abuse. As Gururani
points out, knowledge of forest boundaries and some awareness of the ofﬁcial
rules and regulations of use does little to stop local people from entering the
forest: ‘they rely on the long tradition of collecting fuel and fodder from
forests designated as reserved and devise strategies to claim a share of the
forest’ (2001, 171).
 
26
 
Though Forest Department rules are not always upheld, access and use of
forest resources are not entirely unregulated. Local villagers hold well-deﬁned
norms of use that are more strictly enforced. If a 
 
ghasni
 
 is to provide fodder to
last the winter it is necessary to restrict its use. In spring these areas may be
grazed freely but, by common consent, such areas are out of bounds to grazing
animals with the onset of the monsoon rains. After this time new grass is
allowed to grow freely until the coming of winter when it is cut, collected and
stored. Compared to 
 
ghasni
 
, restrictions on 
 
charan
 
 are determined by residence
rather than season. With animals grazing 
 
charan
 
 year round there is little grass
 
24
 
It is not unusual for Gaddi families to own homes at different altitudes of the sides of a valley.
From the winter home low down they move up to their summer house around mid May to begin
preparations for maize planting.
 
25
 
Also know as 
 
ghalla
 
, 
 
gochar
 
 or 
 
juh.
26 Though originally written about Uttaranchal, Gururani’s comments apply equally well in
Himachal Pradesh.
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left to use for fodder and hence less need for restrictions on use. However, in
the case of the Gaddi shepherds, it is generally agreed that their migratory ﬂocks
should not be allowed such land for too long, as this would leave insufﬁcient
grazing for livestock kept in the village. Only local Gaddi ﬂocks may graze areas
of ghasni and charan and then for no more than two or three days; shepherds from
other areas are expected to move across without delay. These rules are rarely
hard and fast: shepherds’ difﬁculties in ﬁnding adequate grazing throughout the
year are well recognized and restrictions may be relaxed and entitlements
stretched at certain times and for certain individuals. A ﬁnal source of grazing is
found in the restricted forest, supposedly ﬁrmly off-limits to the Gaddi ﬂocks.
The prospect of being ﬁned if caught does not seem to deter most shepherds
from occasionally allowing their sheep and goats to ‘stray’ across the boundaries
of Forest Department reserves.
After two weeks close to their home villages, the shepherds are ready to move
to higher pastures. Known as trakar, gahar or thatch, these grazing areas are located
below the tree line or at the point where forest gives way to alpine pasture.
Trakars are those pastures to which a return visit from the nearest village may
be made in a single day. Above the Saal valley, good grazing is to be found
strung along the ridge that runs for 10 kilometres between the high points of
Bari Jhamohar and Topi. The ridge has an altitude of between 2800 and 3000
metres along its length and is covered in snow from November through to the
end of March. Though this land is under Forest Department control, the shep-
herds are able to gain admission to it in a number of ways. Some shepherds’
claims to use these pastures and to enter the forest around them are based on
long-term usage, i.e. over several generations. According to Deso:
When we settle in one place then others won’t come even though there is
no permit or legal right for that one place. Going to the same place every
year becomes tradition and others won’t use it if they know that someone
else is already established there. An understanding exists about who stays
where and that they shouldn’t be disrupted or disturbed. However, if a
place hasn’t been used for several years then others may then move in. For
example, my father [Bhensu Ram] used to stay every year at Bari Jhamo-
har. Then, one year, he decided to shift over to Dugga Got because he was
tied up with some shepherds from Charira village [close to Dugga Got].
Since that time other shepherds have gone to Bari Jhamohar while we stay
at Dugga Got.
While some ﬂocks are able to camp at gots to which they claim an exclusive
customary right of use, other groups, including Deso’s, stay on land that
ofﬁcially should be used only by the Gujjar buffalo herders that camp there
during the summer months. At several places along the ridge Gujjar families
have constructed kotas – ﬂat roofed, three-walled dwellings made of wood and
mud. At each of these a named Gujjar holds a Forest Department permit, giving
them a monopoly right to graze there. Deso explained the arrangement that
allowed him to bring his ﬂock here:
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This place is called Dugga Got. Sharma Un’s family [a group of Gujjars]
have the permit of this area so they can stop us using it27 . . . [But] before
they arrive and after they have gone we can use these pastures without any
restriction. Any shepherd can use it. How long shepherds stay here depends
on where they are going, what other pastures they have and the general
condition of the grazing. If the pasture is green they may stay a day or two
longer than usual. If the pasture is less green then they stay a day or two less.
In fact, far from any shepherd using any pasture, it seems that the same shep-
herds are likely to return to the same kotas every year. In a later interview28 Deso
explained this: ‘I have a friendship with Sharma Un so I am able to stay here but
others cannot’.29 While other Gaddi ﬂocks may move across a pasture, certain
identiﬁable individuals and groups make a strong claim to temporary exclusive
access during the last two weeks of Baisakh (early to mid May) and again in the
month of Kartik (late October). Here we can see another niche into which Gaddi
migration ﬁts: the Gujjars do not arrive until late May, by which time the Gaddis
have left. Similarly, in the later part of the season the Gaddis don’t return until
the Gujjars have moved south. The Gaddis argue that, as their sheep and goats
graze differently from cattle,30 their short stay will not reduce the grazing avail-
able to the Gujjars’ buffalos.
To this tableau of Saal valley shepherds and local farmers, Gujjars and the
Forest Department, an additional level of complexity is added by a number of
ﬂocks whose migration route follows the Bari Jhamohar–Topi ridge, but whose
shepherds can not claim residence in any of the nearby villages. Several groups
of shepherds, most from around Bharmour at the eastern end of the Chamba
valley, choose to follow this path early in the season. The expectation is that they
will move quickly through, staying only one night at each grazing place. How-
ever, under exceptional circumstances, or in return for payment or some later
reciprocal arrangement, the Saal valley shepherds will happily allow them to stay
for longer, declaring their sheep and goats as their own in the event of a visit
from Forest Department guards.
With the shepherds staying within easy visiting distance of their villages, it is
possible for their relatives to watch over the ﬂocks, allowing them some time at
home. Deso’s 12-year-old son Ravi spends a few days at this time watching over
his father’s ﬂock. In spring such arrangements release adult shepherds to help
in preparing their families’ ﬁelds for maize planting. This is also the time for
shearing, a process which commences with the sheep being washed in a stream.
27 Several of the shepherds were a little indignant at this point, asserting that as the place was called
a Got (i.e. a Gaddi grazing ground) rather than a Gujjar dhar, then Gujjars should not hold a permit
for grazing there. Rather than being rigidly deﬁned, we see here that access can be contested even
on the basis of place names and the implications these have for traditional usage.
28 Conducted in October rather than May.
29 In return for being allowed to stay at Dugga Got, Deso takes a number of sheep belonging to
Sharma Un up to the higher (and dryer) summer pastures of Lahoul.
30 ‘Even if a very large ﬂock comes [to this Gujjar pasture] it is not damaging. Sheep don’t pull up
roots when eating; they just eat the top of the grass.’
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The following day, ten or more men will arrive to assist with the cut. Those
shepherds with very large ﬂocks, and any whose home villages are not in the
Saal valley, must expect to give a share (10–15 per cent) of the wool to these
shearers. More often relatives and friends are happy to assist and are given a
communal meal in return.
The majority of the Gaddi ﬂocks that spend these months grazing on the
forests above the Saal valley follow the same migration trail from the winter
grazing ground around Chakki to the Saal valley, the Tundah Nalla and then the
alpine pastures near Udaipur in Lahoul. By the end of Baisakh (mid-May) the
days are getting warmer and shepherds are ready to move on.
The Communal Basis of Gaddi Nomadism
The above description of the month spent in and around the Saal valley demon-
strates the extent to which Gaddi nomadism is a communally based activity.
Social relations not only contribute to the determination of group composition
and promote understanding and mutual support between different groups, but
also play a crucial role in shaping the arrangements through which grazing
resources are accessed. As I go on to show, these ties and relationships allow an
understanding of resource use practices which is considerably at odds with the
ofﬁcial position held by the Forest Department. First though it is worth consid-
ering the purpose and character of such arrangements.
In his study of the Raika shepherds of Rajasthan, Arun Agrawal (1999) con-
siders why they choose to migrate as a collective and how doing so assists them
in their quest to ﬁnd pasture. Combined ﬂocks save on consumption costs and also
enjoy considerable economies of scale, not least through the enhanced bargaining
position that strength of numbers provides. Given the need for interaction with
potentially hostile settled communities, the physical security that group migration
offers should also not be underestimated. Such beneﬁts are not inconsiderable
and are apparent in the Gaddi example also. ‘As herders the Gaddis projected a
strong and separate social identity, for this enabled them to interact more effec-
tively with the state and settled society’ (Singh 1998, 121). What is more inter-
esting, at least from the perspective of this article, are the ways in which travelling
as part of a group can serve to open up a wider range of potential points of access
to pasture resources when compared with individual migration. Each member of
the group brings different connections to relatives, associates and acquaintances
which are pooled for the beneﬁt of the group as a whole.
While ‘community’ is often valorized as harmonious, egalitarian and afﬁrma-
tive, it is important to acknowledge that it also can place limits on the action and
potential of individual group members with requirements and obligations that
constrain independence of enterprise. However (and for the purposes of this
study rather interestingly), in the case of the Gaddis the construction of commu-
nal ties is not necessarily qualiﬁed by a subsequent loss of freedom of individual
action. Bhasin’s study of Gaddi social organization emphasized the distinct lack
of rigidity in their social relations compared with those in much of India.
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The forgoing study of family patterns and social relations among the
Gaddis of Bharmour leaves one with [the] overwhelming impression of
ﬂexibility and ﬂuctuations. There are several levels at which the people
of the village are related or bound to one another, there are several degrees
of intimacy and permanence, within these relationships or bonds. Whether
it is a setup of family or membership of a Dharam Bhai bond, there is no
rigidity or permanence. Social relationships as a matter of fact provide us
with an index to the adaptation that the Gaddis have made to their ecology
. . . Thus, while on the one hand there is snapping of bonds, on the other
new ties are formed – this contradictory tendency is the result of the
ecology to which the Gaddis have to adapt. (Bhasin 1988, 137–8)
Bhasin’s study of Gaddi social relations suggests that, far from constraining
individuals within ‘traditional’ limits, their ties and relationships can be quickly
constructed or reformulated as and when the situation demands. The ﬂexibility
of social bonds amongst the Gaddis enables them to establish close ties of mutual
help and cooperation with a wide range of other people according to their dif-
ferent needs. Such forms of social organization are, according to Bhasin, of great
importance in nomadism in a mountainous ecological setting, where individuals
may be distanced from close kin and therefore unable to rely on them for assist-
ance or social interaction. Though Bhasin’s study was conﬁned to a number of
villages at the eastern end of the Chamba valley, it is apparent that ﬂexible bonds
and shifting alliances are also heavily utilized in the shepherds’ migration. As the
previous section demonstrated, it is possible to ﬁnd strong material reasons for
the community of Gaddi shepherds to function as a whole rather than operating
as separate individuals. The ability to forge strong yet ﬂexible bonds while on
the move underpins the workings of this system.
Rather than simplifying resource users into a single, undifferentiated and
essentialized community, it is important to recognize their multiple identities,
strategies and aims. Doing so allows for the full spectrum of access rights to
become apparent and also the patterns of negotiation and disagreement over
access, use and management rights that take place within a hierarchy of varied
users. ‘Community’ applied to Gaddi shepherds is a somewhat loose term. Iden-
tities and boundaries are relatively permeable and a number of interactive and
overlapping networks of resource users can be identiﬁed from amongst Gaddi
shepherds, Gujjar buffalo herders and local cultivators. Far from the simple
rules and small user group size emphasized by Ostrom and others, the Saal valley
case demonstrates considerable complexity in a range of access arrangements.
Another commonly cited feature of successful common property institutions is
that of homogeneity among users. Certainly relations within and between shep-
herding groups should not be seen as egalitarian. Signiﬁcant disparities exist in
terms of wealth and the ability to gain access to pasture – wealthier and better
connected shepherds are able to exploit their position to attract the extra labour
they need to care for their livestock. It seems that the ﬂexibility of association
identiﬁed by Bhasin (above) allows economic differences between herders
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without resulting in destructive social conﬂict – those offering labour and those
with excess capacity on their permits are partially interdependent. As we shall
see, though, while a hierarchy of rights and responsibilities exists within groups
of resource users, all members play some role in determining the management
and use of the resources. Perhaps it is better to dispense with simple, and dicho-
tomous, notions of the ‘individual’ and the ‘communal’, and more satisfactory
to posit a shifting calculus spanning individual interest and mutual beneﬁt,
selﬁshness and brotherly feeling. Such ties and alliances extend beyond kinship
groups to encompass relations with other Gaddis and with the range of different
communities, both sedentary and nomadic, through whose lands the shepherds
must pass.
SUMMER AND MONSOON
Jeth (mid-May to mid-June)
The Hindi month of Jeth (mid-May to mid-June) marks the beginning of summer.
With ﬁelds now occupied by the maize crop and the Gujjars arriving to reclaim
their permit dhar, it is time for the Saal valley shepherds to move on. Their next
substantial destination is the grazing pastures of the Tundah Nalla, a journey of
between nine and ten days. From Dugga Got, Deso’s group aim to reach the
north end of the Saal valley in a single day. Above Sarahan village Prithu’s family
have a du dhar (private pasture), where the ﬂock grazes for a couple of days
before moving out of the valley by way of Panch Ungla.31 Their next stop is
Sikrena village, where they have a longstanding arrangement with one of the
Gaddi farmers – in return for taking some of his sheep and goats on migration,
he allows them the use of a private pasture above the village.
The shepherds are now in an area known as Belg. Their route takes them
down the steep hillside and slightly south to a point where they reach the river
that bisects this valley. At this point crossing the fast-ﬂowing river would be
difﬁcult, so the ﬂock is led north along its left bank for a few hours before fording
and climbing up the other side. A short distance below the Sangharani Pass,
Deso’s dhan camps for the night in a forest clearing known as Korara Got. Nidhia
explained to me the arrangements regarding the use of such stopping places:
We will stay at this pasture which is called Korara Got just for this one day
. . . Everyone can use this got – it’s on the route up to Tundah Nalla and
the Kalichho pass so hundreds of ﬂocks use this pasture each year. Gujjars
also stay here . . . Camps such as this [which have no exclusive owners]
will not be overused as ﬂocks don’t stay long and when they move on there
will be enough grass left for others to use. Usually ﬂocks will stay for only
a day at such places but sometimes they may stay for two or three days
31 Panch Ungla is a series of ridges which, from certain viewpoints, looks rather like ﬁve ﬁngers
clenched in a ﬁst. The pass out of the Saal valley is known as Swagatdwari – ‘Heaven’s gate’.
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depending on the thinking of the malundi, how he feels about the needs of
his ﬂock and when he has to cross the next pass or reach the high pastures
. . . This [moving every day] is one of our own customs rather than a rule
imposed on us by the government.
This links to a description of the coordinated movement of the different Saal
valley ﬂocks provided by Deso:
Normally we keep in mind the places they will stop each day. If on the
route two or three ﬂocks are moving then one will always be slightly ahead
and the others slightly behind. There is an understanding that each will use
a different stopping point each night . . . If the ﬁrst ﬂock is already estab-
lished at a stopping point then the second will continue on a bit further. In
this way we pass each other until we reach the big pastures . . . We never
have disagreement over this – we have to work together [so] it’s not a
problem.
The next day, the sixth since leaving Dugga Got, Deso’s dhan climb the last
stretch up to the Sangharani Pass and exit Belg to head down into the Baili
valley. As we shall see, in this area ﬁnding grazing becomes more problematic;
the shepherds have no close contacts here and must pass through as quickly as
possible. Things are complicated by the arrival of the Gujjars’ buffalo herds that
this particular year left their winter pastures earlier than usual due to a lack of
fodder. Normally it is thought reasonable for Gaddi ﬂocks to cross Gujjar
pastures even if the permit holder is in residence. However, on the hillside below
the Sangharani Pass, two Gujjar women strongly object to Deso’s ﬂock passing
over what they claim as their exclusive pasture. The Gujjars complain that their
buffalo will refuse to graze on areas that have been polluted by the droppings of
sheep and goats. After a lengthy argument, it is agreed that the ﬂock can cross
provided they divert to a longer, and more difﬁcult, path that runs along the
edge of the pasture rather than moving through the centre of it. Deso is under-
standably annoyed:
The problem is that the Gujjar block the way and stop us from using the
pastures. They are always exaggerating their permit land beyond what is
allowed. Buffalos destroy grass and it doesn’t come back. Now the problem
is worse than before – there are more Gujjar and more buffalos and they
act like goondas [gangsters] – they steal the blankets we leaves in our camps.
Four or ﬁve shepherds can’t ﬁght two or three entire Gujjar families.
Having crossed the Gujjar permit dhar the ﬂock reaches Almi village and Deso
arranges to stay in the village pasture land in return for a small payment to the
pradhan (headman). The next day they cover several more miles before camping
at Silaru Got. This is Forest Department territory and, since it has recently been
declared as reserved, the shepherds have no right to be there. When land is closed
off to shepherds the Forest Department must provide an alternative and equivalent
area of pasture, but Deso, for reasons he did not explain, continues to take the
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customary route. Were the shepherds to be caught trespassing in the forest they
would be ﬁned.32
From Silaru Got to the 3600 metre Silaru Pass is a walk of a few hours. Here
the shepherds enter the Tundah Nalla, where the Saal valley shepherds have
traditional permit rights to deﬁned areas of pasture. To reach their area of permit
land, Deso and his companions must ﬁrst spend a few nights staying on land that
belongs to other groups. Tired from the rapid crossing of Belg and Baili, they
spend two nights at Kud and another two each at the pastures called Chilot and
Jhannu. The permit holders for these places have not yet arrived, and, ‘depending
on the grass’, illicit use of the pasture is considered acceptable by the shepherds.
Nidhia’s explanation of these access arrangements differs somewhat from the
Forest Department’s rules:
When walking [moving every day] we don’t need a permit but for longer
stopping places then the name of the pasture shall be mentioned on the
permit. Big gots33 belong exclusively to one group of shepherds and can be
used only by their ﬂock. However sometimes, before or after the right
holder has passed, others may use the pasture for a short time.
Towards the head of the Tundah Nalla is a steep sided valley called Jui, one side
of which, from the stream at its bottom to the ridge at the top, is known as Jui
Charola. In this area Deso’s family are recorded in the forest settlement as being
permitted to exercise certain carefully deﬁned customary rights, namely the
grazing of 200 sheep and 200 goats. Nearly two weeks since leaving their last
secure grazing place, Deso’s group, along with the other eight or nine dhans
from the Saal valley, reach the upper pastures of the Tundah Nalla. Each group
claims the customary right to use a named area of pasture: Fuula dhar, Jui
Charola, Jui Chilot, Pathnai Got, Lamba Paro etc. A young shepherd named
Pyaro explained the attraction of the place to me:
Everything is available at Jui: pasture, food and drink. The wool produced
is very nice and the water is healthy. Our animals grow very big during
their time here – bears can’t kill them because their claws can’t pierce their
hearts through the layers of fat! . . . We are comfortable here.
They remain here for a full month at altitudes of between 3000 and 3500 metres.
Having reached Jui Charola, the ﬁrst ‘ofﬁcial’ grazing place of the journey
thus far, it is worth examining the workings of the grazing permit system and
the various ways in which shepherds are able to access pasture here. Deso’s
grazing permit (carried wrapped in waterproof plastic at the back of his wallet)
mirrors the entry in the Forest Department Register for Lower Chamba Range.
It reads as follows:
32 The shepherds told me that the penalty for trespassing on Forest Department land was a ﬁne of
Rs. 5 per animal plus (unofﬁcially) the forest guard may take up to ﬁve animals for himself.
33 The term got describes an alpine meadow where shepherds stay for several weeks in the summer
months.
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Bhensu Ram s/o Uttam Chand of Village Baal (Saal). No. 673.
Sheep 150, Goats 150, Lambs 50; Kids 50.
Jui Charola, Bhasi dhar top, Chakki Ban.
Permit Issued by Chamba Division 25-04-02.
Forest Department regulations state that a customary right derives from
inheritance only and cannot be transferred under any circumstances. When a family
abandons pastoralism and stops using its pastures, then the permit is cancelled
and full rights over the land revert to the state. Here we ﬁnd a disjuncture
between the ways that shepherds and forest ofﬁcials view the workings of this
system of permits, customary rights and grazing tax. Originally the job of malundi
would have been entrusted to a shepherd who used a particular grazing place. A
malundi’s responsibility was to occupy the pasture to what was judged to be the
maximum sustainable level of animals, and to ensure that the grazing tax for this
number of animals was collected and passed on to the state. This is the arrange-
ment that the Gaddis continue to recognize: crucially it implies that a shepherd
does not need to hold a grazing permit in order to travel with their ﬂock. A
corollary of this is that the person named on the permit as having user rights to
graze animals at a particular pasture does not necessarily have to shepherd with
the ﬂock or indeed to actually own any animals himself. As Phillimore (1981) points
out, with ﬂuctuation in fortunes, division through inheritance and inevitable
sedentarization, over time the original connection between a particular pasture
and a malundi may be broken. To the Forest Department this would mean that the
customary right to graze ceases to exist. Furthermore, the ofﬁcial position is that to
be allowed to travel each and every grazier must hold a permit. From this perspec-
tive a permit detailing customary rights is a prerequisite for all ﬂock-owning
Gaddis rather than just a guarantee of access to certain points along the way.
Interestingly, the divide between these two seemingly irreconcilable positions
is not necessarily unbridgeable. The Gaddis and the ofﬁcials of the Forest Depart-
ment seem to have established a kind of working equilibrium; throughout this
description we see examples of compromise and ﬂexibility on both sides. The
pasture of Jui Charola provides a ﬁne initial illustration of the de facto functioning
of this system. Taking each shepherd from the group that accompanies Deso we
are able to construct the ties of kinship, money and labour that bring the group
together and work to ensure access to grazing at Jui Charola. It is fair to say that,
to varying extents, none of these ties conform to the ofﬁcial rules through which
grazing is supposed to be governed.
1. Deso. As the permit holder’s son, Deso has an incontestable right to continue
to graze his ﬂock at the pastures named. Though Bhensu’s name remains on the
permit document, Deso is the de facto malundi. It is Deso’s access to the pasture
at Jui Charola that conforms most closely to the Forest Department ideal.
2. Nidhia. Being Uttam Chand’s younger son, Nidhia would have been
legally entitled to a half share in the customary entitlement to the pastures
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at Jui Charola, Bhasi Dhar and the winter grazing grounds around Chakki. It
was his inherited right to hold an ofﬁcial permit conﬁrming this. Instead, when
Uttam Chand died it was decided to keep intact the customary grazing
grounds and for the permit to show Bhensu Ram’s name alone. While in the eyes
of the Forest Department this means that Nidhia has no formal stake in these
pastures, he does possess a considerable moral claim on continued use. Nidhia
explains that he did not want the bother of entering into any formal arrange-
ments with the sarkar (government) and stresses that he can rely on Bhensu and
Deso not to deny him what he see as very much his right. If they were not to
fulﬁl this obligation they would be subject to the strong disapproval of the
community.
3. Bir. Nidhia’s son Bir also maintains a claim to the pasture at Jui Charola based
on the family tie to Bhensu Ram. Every year Bir and Nidhia give 50 ps (paisa)34
for each of their goats and 25 ps for each sheep to Deso, who passes this on to
the Forest Department in his own name.
4. Prithu. Though Deso recognizes some degree of kinship with Prithu, it is not
signiﬁcant enough for the latter to make any claim to the customary usage of the
pastures recorded in the Forest Department permit. Instead, Prithu’s ability to
stay at Jui Charola is based on his provision of access to grazing elsewhere: a
reciprocal arrangement exists between Prithu, Deso, Nidhia and Bir, whereby
they travel with one another and share grazing. For each this opens up access to
grazing in locations where they are formally deﬁcient.
5. Mohinder and Dimu. Unlike Prithu, the chote puhal Mohinder and Dimu do
not possess a claim to customary grazing and therefore must gain access by other
means. Owing to the relatively large total ﬂock size that includes a proportion
of animals sent by non-shepherding Gaddis, Deso’s group requires additional
manpower. Mohinder and Dimu’s claim to access is based on the labour they
provide. Ofﬁcially, for those who do not possess a grazing permit migration
with a ﬂock is forbidden. Unofﬁcially, such barriers are overcome by joining
with a permit holder whose own ﬂock does not exhaust the maximum
quota allowed on the permit. Such arrangements are made on various bases:
for simple friendship or through family connections, in return for monetary or
non-monetary reward, for labour or in order to be able to access grazing
land elsewhere.35
34 100 ps is equal to 1 rupee.
35 Taking on additional animals is of some beneﬁt to permit holders as it enables them to pay the
full grazing tax while, at the same time, maintaining the spare capacity on their quota that gives them
the ﬂexibility to increase their own ﬂock should they wish to do so. In this way permit holders
maintain the freedom for their ﬂocks to rise or fall in size according to domestic considerations and
the family’s available labour.
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It is not unusual for individual shepherds to take a slightly different route
from the others they normally travel with and to team up with a new group for
a short time if the conditions are favourable. This is indeed the case at Jui where,
a week after they arrived, Deso’s group are joined by Jamul whose home village
is close to Kwarsi on the north side of the Dhaula Dhar range.
6. Jamal. Jamal provides another example of how those who lack the ofﬁcial
requirement of a customary right are still able to access pasture. Like
Mohinder and Dimu, Jamal does not possess a permit. However, his family’s
long history of migration has allowed them to build up a network of contacts
and relationship under whose protection Jamal is able to travel. To gain
access to the grazing in the upper part of the Tundah Nalla, Jamal gives to Deso
and Nidhia an amount equal to the annual grazing tax they would pay on his
animals. At other pastures Jamal says he is expected to give something more,
either an animal or additional cash, but Deso seems happy enough with the
simple monetary arrangement. He explained his willingness to collaborate with
Jamal in this way as being based on ‘nothing – just friendship’. Here, as else-
where, Deso invokes the concept of bhai bandi36 as the reason for providing
assistance to Jamal.
As at Bari Jhamohar, again we can see the formation of temporary communities
on the move. Such alliances between groups of Gaddis and also with other
pastoralists (the Gujjars) and settled cultivators in different locations are a feature
found throughout this case study.
Asarh (mid-June to mid-July)
Each year the ﬂocks spend most of the month of Asarh (mid-June to mid-July)
grazing on the alpine pastures above the Tundah Nalla. Pastures such as Jui,
above the tree line and far distant from the nearest village, are known as dhar or
nighar. The Gaddis consider such places the home of the Gods and Goddess as
well as various benevolent and malevolent lesser spirits and so must adhere to a
set of rules37 to avoid their displeasure.
Before crossing the Pir Panjal range, the shepherds must appease the deities
of each pass. During the second half of Asarh (early July) they undertake a series
of religious ceremonies, culminating with the ritual slaughter of a number of
animals. On the third Tuesday of Asarh a series of sacriﬁces are made at Banni
village and permission to make the pass crossing is requested from the Goddess.
Several hundred Gaddi dhan cross the Kalichho pass each year and these rituals
provide a degree of organization and coordination in the timings of movement
and the order in which the ﬂocks should proceed.
36 ‘Brotherhood’ – a moral requirement to do something for others without the expectation of
getting anything back (other than respect and recognition).
37 Know as sooch, these rules dictate where and when the cooking should be carried out, place
strictures on toilet activities and forbid the making of noise, particularly at night.
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Sawan (mid-July to mid-August)
July sees the arrival of the monsoon and for the next two months the Chamba
valley will be subjected to heavy rains. Although some shepherds remain in
Chamba, many cross the Pir Panjal range in order to exploit the freshly uncov-
ered grass of Lahoul and to protect their animals from the damp conditions to
the south.
Immediately after descending from the Kalichho pass, Deso’s group spend
one night at a grazing got near the foot of the glacial moraine. There is little
grazing here, so the next day they move on to their summer dhar. Most of the
Saal valley ﬂocks spend the rainy season in pastures up the side valleys south of
the Chandra Bagha River to the west of the town of Udaipur. For the ﬁrst two
weeks of Sawan Deso’s group stay at Bhansi Dhar, a small grazing ground on
the upper part of a hillside. Bhansi Dhar Top is included on Bhensu’s permit,
legitimizing the customary right of access that Deso’s family enjoy over this area
of pasture. While possessing the ‘traditional’ right, in fact the history of this
arrangement is more recent than at ﬁrst appears. Until the 1950s Bhansi Dhar,
like many other grazing places in the area, was under the control of a thakur38
who lived in a nearby village. In the past, Lahouli thakurs controlled the use of
pastures and were able to impose levies on the shepherds who wished to graze
upon them. Shepherds did not need permits but had to come to an agreement
with the thakur – typically payment was in kind: a quantity of wool and meat or
some animals. In pre-colonial times these payments were supposedly passed on
to the Raja; however, by the time of independence, this system had broken
down and the thakurs were acting as de facto landowners controlling large areas
of grazing ground in this part of Lahoul. This situation was rectiﬁed by the
Government of India, which assumed ownership of the land, thus allowing the
shepherds to retain their rights of use. Bhensu Ram explained to me the relative
merits of the two systems: ‘the thakur system was easy but costly. Getting per-
mits from the Forest Department is harder but cheaper’.
Before this reorganization, seven or eight large dhans, comprising more than
20 shepherds, used to graze their ﬂocks at Bhansi Dhar under a variety of
arrangements. After taking over the land the Forest Department divided the
customary right equally between these shepherds, leaving each with an area
insufﬁcient to supply their needs for the full six weeks of their stay in Lahoul.
With the pasture at Bhansi Dhar Top exhausted after little over a week,
Deso’s group move on to the dhars at Sorbat and Mirkola which are adjacent to
one another. In the Forest Department records the customary right to using
these dhars is vested in three individuals:
Jiga of Badgraon village (in the lower part of the Tundah Nalla);
Labdi Ram also of Badgraon;
Riga, son of Soraji, from Chirira village.
38 Feudal landholder.
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These combined permits allow the grazing of more than 1600 sheep and goats.
Deso is able to claim a right to a portion of the dhars at Sorbat and Mirkola by
virtue of Jiga being his maternal grandfather.39
Close to the intersection of two streams, a couple of small stone huts provide
a degree of comfort for the shepherds, which is much needed at an altitude of
3600 metres. The huts are roughly central to the collective summer grazing:
Mirkola covers both valley sides to the northwest, while Sorbat stretches south-
east running to the base of a glacier. Unlike at Bhansi Dhar, the shepherds at
Sorbat Mirkola have reached an agreement whereby they pool their animals
during the time they spend there. Thanks to this arrangement fewer shepherds
are required to look after the sheep and goats. Nidhia returned home at Jui and,
having delivered the ﬂock to Sorbat-Mirkola, both Prithu and Dimu take the
opportunity to walk back to Chamba and spend a few weeks in their home
villages. Normally six or seven shepherds stay with the ﬂocks at this time. Deso,
Bir and Mohinder spend the next four weeks here, along with Bhagtu, Haroo
and Hardiyal from the Saal valley and Jiga’s son and grandson from Badgraon
village.40
Pooling ﬂocks has additional advantages for use of the pastures. Each day the
combined ﬂock is divided into different groups: sheep go to a suitable grassy area
of the dhar, goats are grazed higher up, while expectant mothers and newborn
animals remain near the camp. Over the next month the animals are moved to
different parts of the dhar, thereby rotating the grazing area. Starting lower
down, they gradually make their way up the hillsides. Within ten days of being
grazed, grass has re-grown and can be grazed again.
It is important to recognize the difference between a resource being ‘held
collectively’ and ‘used collectively’. Though the pastures at Sorbat-Mirkola and
Jui are not owned by the user group (the state owns the land and delegates right
of use to named individuals), they are used collectively, with all users responsible
for management. It might be expected that ofﬁcial rights holders would enjoy
certain superior rights within these pastures. However, as Bhattacharya points
out, though the shepherd in possession of a permit holds certain limited powers
and privileges, ‘his right to his ban was no different from that of the other
families who formed a part of the group he led’ (1995, 55). Bhattacharya goes
on to suggest that while segregation and the recognition of rights over a partic-
ular area of pasture serves to restrict competition and reduce conﬂict between
groups of herders, within each area of pasture ‘collective, non-individual rights
. . . ensured co-operation among each herding group’ (1995, 55). As I suggest
39 Such maternal links are unusual – this was the only case of a claim being traced through the
shepherd’s mother’s side that I came across. It is possible that the usual strict inheritance arrange-
ments were relaxed here by virtue of the large amount of spare pasture at Sorbat-Mirkola and in
order to raise some extra cash to pay the grazing tax.
40 Of the other ofﬁcial permit holders for this area, Labdi Ram sold his ﬂock many years ago and
reached some arrangement with Jiga about continuing to graze under the protection of his customary
right. None of the shepherds recognized the names of Riga or Soraji (though Jiga did recall that he
had relatives from Chirira village).
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below, here we see the appearance of a shadow system – two distinct sets of
rules, the interplay of which determines ﬁnal access arrangements. On the one
hand, the ofﬁcial system designates a named individual with whom the state
deals; on the other hand, the use and management of each dhar is collectively
determined by all users, thereby promoting a certain shared interest. Policing of
use and exclusion of non-group members are more effectively carried out by a
collective than by the formal right holder acting alone. The workings of this
system chime well with the attitude of Forest Department ofﬁcials that while at
their Lahouli dhars the shepherds can be ‘left to police themselves’. Those with-
out permits and who have reached no arrangements to graze are ejected from
permit pasture, using force if necessary, by collective groups of users. Ofﬁcial
intervention is limited to collecting the grazing tax, limiting illegal incursions
into reserved forest, and the occasional attempt to enumerate some of the ﬂocks.
With little else to do, Deso and other members of this group make several visits
to the small town of Udaipur with the intention of visiting the temple,41 selling
some animals to butchers there, and ‘taking refreshments’ at liquor stores.
Investing Property with Meaning – Formal and Informal Rights
The above account demonstrates, at least in the case of Gaddi shepherds, that the
anticipated shift from common to private property management is by no means
inevitable. Contrary to predictions of demise, the communal basis of migrations
is readily apparent with grazing resources frequently used and managed by joint
units over and above the individual. If, as Scott (1998) and others have pointed
out, the structure and workings of the modern state leaves available space in
which local agency may make itself apparent, it is necessary to examine the role
played by local agents in ensuring the survival of communal methods for access-
ing natural resources. Here we are interested in the pays réal as much as in the
pays légal – what actually happens rather than what the law books say.
Of course, deﬁnitions and categorizations of systems of property right are
discursive constructs. ‘Open access’, ‘private’, ‘state’ and ‘common’ property are
ideal types useful to facilitate analysis, but are not necessarily readily distinguish-
able in the real world: ‘in practice, many resources are held in overlapping, and
sometimes conﬂicting combinations of these regimes, and there is variation
within each’ (Feeny et al. 1998, 78).
The work of Pauline Peters (1987, 1994) demonstrates a subtle appreciation of
property relations which centres on ‘meaning’ and the inﬂuence of culture on the
arrangements governing resource use. Peters points out that far from communal
holdings implying ‘an undifferentiated, general right of all to use the speciﬁc
resource held in common’, in fact ‘most so-called communal systems are char-
acterized both by multiple or overlapping rights that are not identical and by a
combination of individual and group rights’ (1987, 181).
41 Making an offering in thanks for successfully crossing the pass.
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It is clear that understanding the patterns of use . . . depends on investigat-
ing the multiplicity of and competition among rights to range resources
and not on positing the confrontation between individual rational herders
and a group demanding selﬂess action. Moreover, one must also attend to
the level of meaning . . . Competition among rights and claims take place
through competition in meanings. These are assigned, accepted and imposed:
whose right, which meaning, whose deﬁnition are critical questions in
deciphering changes in systems of land rights. (Peters 1987, 192)
Central to any examination of property regimes must be a consideration
of the diversity of perspectives on both ‘property’ in itself and the systems of
management that govern its use. To understand properly the variety of
means through which resources are accessed, Peters suggests that it is
necessary to dispense with rigid deﬁnitions of property types and of the binary
distinctions (state vs people, private vs common, individual vs collective, self-
interest vs altruism) upon which they are based, and instead focus on the social,
political and economic structures in which resource users are embedded. It is
in these wider structures that ‘meaning’ is found and they are therefore key to
determining how property is deﬁned. If ‘common property’ exists, it is not as a
legal or geographical entity, but rather as sets of social relations. By moving
from a preoccupation with the ofﬁcial language of rules, regulations and
boundaries we can begin to differentiate the deﬁnitions applied by the state and
the myriad subtleties of local meaning as they emerge in the realm of everyday
interaction. Local cultures internalize such ofﬁcial vocabularies and translate
them into the vernacular, thereby giving them new meanings in how they are
understood and applied.
This account of the means by which a single group of Gaddi shepherds gains
access to pasture illustrates a diverse range of ownership regimes and varied
strategies through which aims may be attained. In some cases, most notably on
farmers’ ﬁelds, the right to exclude others and to regulate the use of the resource
is clearly vested in an individual. Farmers are in a position to determine who
may (and may not) utilize their fallow ﬁelds for grazing and on what terms they
may do so. Even so, individual ownership remains subject to certain social
norms and expectations – private owners must obey certain moral obligations
and are inﬂuenced by social ties and relationships that open up the rights of
access. And if the use of private agricultural land is subject to the inﬂuence of
wider social and communal norms, then what of arrangements where no single
identiﬁable owner is clearly visible? Away from the cultivated areas, deﬁnitions
of user rights become even more elastic.
As we saw earlier, forest land around the shepherds’ home villages in Chamba
can be accessed at particular times and by recognized groups subject to a number
of restrictions and conventions of use. Access, like the determination and
enforcement of rules of use, derives not simply from settlement reports and
Forest Department manuals, but also from the communities that live in the
vicinity of the forest. Not infrequently, local ideas of what is acceptable may
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differ from those laid down in the rulebooks of the Forest Department: ‘the legal
and the legitimate do not always coincide in the moral economy of rural
Himachal Pradesh’ (Vasan 2002, 4126). Furthermore, the workings of this infor-
mal ‘shadow system’ differ considerably from the rigid bureaucratic arrange-
ments of the state: rights of use are not permanently ﬁxed and may differ by
year, season, month or even time of day. The Gaddis’ use of the Gujjars’ grazing
pastures provides an example: during certain periods the shepherds enjoy fairly
unrestricted use of these pastures, while at other times they are entirely excluded
from them or permitted only to cross rapidly and under sufferance. Similarly,
cultivated ﬁelds are private property through much of the year, but are opened
up during the fallow period. This seasonal shift from exclusive private to com-
mon use shows how local institutional arrangements governing access ﬂuctuate
– temporal changes in recourse management arrangements mesh with the sea-
sonal movements of the shepherds.
Moving to the ‘permit’ pastures of the higher slopes we ﬁnd an ofﬁcial system
in which rights of use are formally vested in a single, deﬁned individual. While
the land is under the ownership of the Forest Department and rights of use are
assigned to individuals, these permit holders remain subject to a range of social
obligations and group pressures that expose and adapt ofﬁcial deﬁnitions by
imbuing them with vernacular meaning. In order to protect a resource from
encroachment it is necessary for individual permit holders to ally themselves
with others. If they did not extend access in this way, isolated permit holders
would be incapable of adequately managing and policing large areas of pasture-
land. Unofﬁcially, rights to pasture are seen as belonging to groups of users
who, by clubbing together, are able to defend their collective territory from
encroachment. Such an ‘identiﬁable community of interdependent users’ clearly
bears many of the characteristics of a common property institution. Distinguish-
ing between a commons as a location and as an activity or organization makes clear
the point that communal institutions have not disappeared despite a century and
a half of pressure on them. On the grazing pastures of Himachal Pradesh there
remain many instances in which ‘individuals within the group coordinate their
actions in order to frame rules for exclusion, use and management, as well as
access, and ensure that these are implemented in a manner consistent with group
objectives’ (Vira 1999, 255).
Natural resource access arrangements in present day Himachal Pradesh rarely
ﬁt into simple, bureaucratically deﬁned and imposed, ‘one-size-ﬁts-all’ catego-
ries. While some property regimes are very clearly deﬁned, others are less so and
hence are ambiguous in terms of any simple scale of property regime types.
Examples from the Gaddi migratory cycle show how resources such as a
restricted forest may be ‘common’ and ‘private’ simultaneously: while the state
claims ownership over these areas, local residents take a different view and,
where they may, opt to exploit forest resources as they (rather than the Forest
Department) see ﬁt. While some residents might hold ‘customary rights’ over
certain forest resources, others do not and resort to subterfuge, often with the
connivance and assistance of the wider community. Where necessary, people
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may act collectively to deny ‘outsiders’ the chance to use the resource, possibly
even enlisting the assistance of Forest Department ofﬁcials to enforce this
exclusion.
Throughout this account of the Saal valley shepherds’ migration, it is
apparent that local deﬁnitions of resource access are rarely synchronous with
those prescribed by the state. Arrangements for accessing grazing resources
are varied and dependent upon (and derived from) indigenous social arrange-
ments and cultural meanings as much as legal designations. A number of
recent works (e.g. Coward 1990; Davidson-Hunt 1995; Guha 1999a; Mosse
2003) recognize the co-existence of informal ‘collective’ alongside statutory
private and state land tenure arrangements. Despite property rights in law
(de jure) supposedly precluding community management of natural resources,
it is still possible for (de facto) shared property rights to be claimed. As a
cultural construction of social relations in which the rights, duties and obliga-
tions of users are clearly deﬁned, common property arrangements prove to be
surprisingly robust, a quality that in part derives from their ﬂexibility and
scope for negotiation. ‘[T]he competing claims and overlapping boundaries of
moral and legal property, rights and livelihood, and rules and practice work to
redeﬁne and reinterpret property in the context of cultural politics’ (Gururani
2001, 172).
If the capacity of the modern state to impose its models of property rights is
frequently overstated, a corollary is that the ability of local people to exercise
agency and determine change is underestimated. ‘The weakness of property
rights analysis is its limited understanding of informal institutions, how they
evolve and how they relate to formal institutions’ (Eggertson cited in Ensminger
1996, 183). Commenting on village systems of water management in Tamil
Nadu, Mosse (2003, 13) writes of how ‘a generalised notion of the decline
of rural institutions’ has contributed to the under-recognition of those that do
continue to exist; the failure of these contemporary commons to conform to
expectations about the ‘village republic’ and its corporate institutions ‘often
make them invisible’. Recognizing the existence of a shadow system, running
alongside the formal one, allows us to observe the operations of local agency
as it impacts upon the formal system imposed by the state.
AUTUMN
Bhadon (mid-August to mid-September)
The start of the Hindi month of Bhadon (mid-August to mid-September) sees
the grass at Sorbat-Mirkola become increasingly threadbare and the shepherds
begin to make preparations for the journey south. Jamal and Dimu rejoin the
group and they shift the ﬂock back to Bhansi Dhar Top for a last few days in
Lahoul before crossing the Kalichho Pass on the 3rd of September. A few days
later they are back at Jui Charola and here they stay at their permit pasture for
the next three weeks.
Gaddi Shepherds in the Indian Himalayas 61
© 2007 The Author.
Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Henry Bernstein and Terence J. Byres.
Journal of Agrarian Change, Vol. 7 No. 1, January 2007, pp. 35–75.
Asooj/Kvar (mid-September to mid-October)
With the beginning of the autumn season the maize crop is harvested in the
Saal valley and the cobs placed on the roofs of houses to dry. Along with the
other Saal valley shepherds, Deso leaves Jui around the middle of Asooj (the end
of September). The downward journey reverses the route taken in June, crossing
the Silaru and Sangharani Passes on the way through Baili and Belg. In the ﬁrst
week of October, Deso’s group re-enters the Saal valley and heads ﬁrst to
Prithu’s home village of Sarahan. Once more they are able to stay at the grazing
pasture (du dhar) belonging to Prithu’s family. Over the past few months
members of Prithu’s extended family have used this area to pasture their cattle,
but it is now vacated to accommodate the migratory ﬂock. Earlier in the year,
when moving north to good grazing in the Tundah Nalla and Lahoul, Deso’s
group halted only brieﬂy at this place. Now, with the grass regenerated by the
recently departed monsoon, they opt to stay longer, thereby delaying the need
to move on to the more intensively used (and expensive) pastures to the south.
Kartik (mid-October to mid-November)
The beginning of the month of Kartik (mid October) ﬁnds the Saal valley
ﬂocks back grazing the pastures between Bari Jhamohar and Topi. Again many
stay on land that is ofﬁcially under the customary right of permit holding Gujjars,
whose recent departure has left their dhars available to the Gaddis again. While
the shepherds may sell sheep and goats throughout the year, this is considered a
good time to ofﬂoad a few more. The animals’ weight will have been increased
by the nutritious grazing in Lahoul, while the difﬁculties of ﬁnding winter graz-
ing and close attention from Forest Department ofﬁcials make this a good time
to reduce ﬂock sizes. The second shearing of the year is carried out with the help
of friends and family. This particular year, Deso chose to spend a few days away
from the ﬂock in order to reconnoitre the winter grazing grounds on the border
of Punjab and Himachal. He returned to say that their customary grazing area
was ‘in worst condition. Barbed wire has closed some of the land off ’. The
feeling was that little could be done about this: ‘we will go and see . . . who can
say what will happen or where our animals can eat?’
The Co-determination of Resource Access Arrangements
This review of the Gaddi shepherds’ annual migration cycle reveals diverse
arrangements by which grazing resources are accessed and used. Some locations,
such as dry river beds or the sides of roads, conform to the open-access model
of Hardin’s work; other grazing places demonstrate rigidly enforced notions of
private ownership by a deﬁned individual; others still are nationalized – owned
(though not always controlled) by the state. Yet, as we have seen, even these
supposedly simple property arrangements are cross-cut by social and political
inﬂuences. Between ideal types there exists a range of access arrangements
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mediated by identity, time and space. The reality is of a wide variety of
property regimes, each demonstrating different facets of individual, communal
and state ownership and control. For deﬁned resources (whether farmers’ ﬁelds,
permit pastures or reserved forest), ideas of ownership differ according to the
perspective of varied observers with access possibilities ﬁltered through multiple
social, economic and political lenses. ‘Shadow systems’ exist beside ofﬁcial
ones – sometime matching, sometimes opposed and sometimes working to
mediate between state regulations and the needs of local people. Informal,
socially embedded arrangements, to a greater or lesser extent, work alongside
ofﬁcial systems of private and state property to determine actual access to natural
resources.
Chetan Singh (1998) suggests that before the colonial settlement and forest
laws were enacted, access to grazing was regulated through a fairly ﬂexible
combination of both collective and segmented rights. Contrary to the beliefs of
many, it appears that this is still the case today. Importantly, this is not to say
that these arrangements and the institutional bases of the local informal system
represent some remnant of a pre-colonial tradition. Certainly, the ‘stable and
isolated’ commons describes by Wade (1988), Gadgil and Guha (1992) and others,
if they ever existed, would have been incapable of enduring the changes that
have occurred over the past century and a half. However, against expectation,
such an outcome does not prevent the possibility of a realignment of common
interests occurring with arrangements for the management of shared resources
constructed anew. In his work on natural resource use in nineteenth-century
Maharasthra, Sumit Guha (1999b, 62) has shown that newly created pressures on
natural resources, instead of destroying common management arrangements,
may actually encourage their creation: ‘rural people soon became aware of the
shortages and began to organized themselves in response to it’ (1999b, 60–1).
What is signiﬁcant, for the remainder of this article, is not the ‘survival’ of
nomadic pastoralism or the common management of grazing resources, but
rather the ways in which such practices are altered through their incorporation
in wider economic and political systems. While some long-standing systems of
organization may disappear with development, others appear able to continue,
while more still are created anew. Of the latter, though ‘form’ may appear
unchanged, ‘content’ is inevitably altered by the transformation of the context in
which they exist. The recognition that they can survive into the era of interna-
tional markets and the modern ‘developmental’ state raises questions about the
origins, form and workings of these contemporary commons. Returning to
the notion of a community-oriented ‘shadow system’ operating alongside
the formal structure of private and state institutions, I argue that not only may
these two seemingly opposed systems co-exist but that, in many ways, they are
interdependent.
In his examination of the connections between the irrigation rights as recorded
by the British in the nineteenth century and the present functioning of communal
irrigation systems (kuhls) in the Kangra valley of Himachal Pradesh, Walter
Coward suggests that ‘the property relations created through the record of rights
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provides much of the social glue required for operating and sustaining the . . .
works’ (1990, 78). Coward argues that the communal arrangements that deter-
mine access to water were in fact actively created by the very processes of set-
tlement and privatization so often blamed for their decline. In many ways the
same applies to Gaddi pastoralism. In the face of inﬂexible ofﬁcial regulation of
movement and grazing access, the shepherds have been forced to self-organize
new social arrangements through which subtlety, ﬂexibility and local appropri-
ateness are re-injected into the resource use systems. Efforts to convert limited
permit pastures (such as those at Sorbat-Mirkola) into large collective grazing
grounds demonstrate how state efforts to individualize and separate resource
users can paradoxically serve as a spur to future communal action.
It is not only that the local ‘shadow’ system represents a response to the
formal rules imposed by the state, but that the rigid regulation, classiﬁcation and
standardization of the latter would be unworkable without the local knowledge
and ﬂexibility provided by the former. If, as Scott (1998) suggests (following
Foucault), the basis of state action is classiﬁcation and simpliﬁcation, then, par-
adoxically, formalization and regulation can also undermine state action. Oper-
ating from distant centres of power, statute and policy are passed down as edicts
that, in the form originally intended, cannot be successfully applied across the
varied locales on which they are imposed. Similarly, information concerning
distant and varied localities, in the process of moving back up the hierarchy, is
homogenized almost to the point of being meaningless. In the Gaddi case, exam-
ples of permit pastures and customary rights demonstrate the extent to which
ofﬁcial policy is unworkable at the local level. Applied to the letter of the law,
the equal division of grazing rights among all descendants would result in such
a degree of fragmentation that the divided inheritance of individual shepherds
would be small and unworkable. Here local solutions of communal control and
management greatly reduce the cost of policing against encroachment and
ensuring appropriate exploitation of the resource. In effect, then, informal,
locally based and socially embedded property arrangements work as an essential
(though unrecognized) complement to the ofﬁcial system. Hanging off state
rules and regulations, these hybrid institutions serve to lower the transaction
costs of the ofﬁcial legal system and provide it with a ﬂexibility and local appro-
priateness that central control denies.
Modern states, working from a distance and deﬁcient in both capacity and
local knowledge, try to impose certain uniform policies on the diverse localities
under their rule. Here a tension between central direction and local autonomy
becomes apparent. Scott uses the ancient Greek concept of ‘metis’ to describe the
local know-how, common sense and practical experience that is missing from
externally imposed plans: ‘the formal order encoded in social-engineering
designs inevitably leaves out elements that are essential to their actual function-
ing’ (Scott 1998, 351). Both mainstream ‘developmental’ and alternative ‘new
traditionalist’ positions share a view of the colonial state as the embodiment of
‘high modernization’, an entity capable of imposing uniform technical solutions
onto diverse local realities. As I have argued elsewhere (Axelby 2005, chapter 4),
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this image of a uniform, all-powerful, controlling state does not match the
reality. Furthermore, as externally determined rules and regulations lack metis,
locally based conventions of negotiation, compromise and accommodation that
exemplify metis increasingly come into effect. The vernacular shadow system,
which exists alongside the ofﬁcial one, works to correct its rigidifying inﬂuence
and maintain the elasticity required to operate in the real world. More ﬂexible,
and locally appropriate, rights to grazing can be shared among shepherds with
access deﬁned and monitored and sanctions enforced according to the shared
interest of the group. Recognizing the complementarities between formal and
informal arrangements allows for the contextual ﬁt crucial to the successful
operation of resource use. In the case of the Gaddi shepherds, processes of
formalization and informalization of tenure rights combine to produce natural
resource access that is ‘neither regulated by predictable rules and structures nor
characterised by sheer anarchy’ (Benjaminsen and Lund 2002, 3).
The work of Francis Cleaver (2000, 2002) similarly suggests that resource use
practices and management arrangements are likely to be a complex blend of the
formal and informal, the traditional and the modern. To distinguish institutions
she employs the terms ‘bureaucratic’ and ‘socially embedded’ for, respectively,
the explicit organizational structures of governments or development agencies
and ‘culture, social organization and daily practice’ (Cleaver 2002, 14). Counter-
ing Ostrom’s notion of the conscious selection of mechanisms best suited for a
collective action task, Cleaver suggests a messier process in which property
rights solutions are pieced together by individuals acting within the bonds of
circumstantial interest. Through a process she terms ‘institutional bricolage’,
Cleaver suggests that people are able to assemble and adapt norms, values and
arrangements from various backgrounds and identities in order to achieve
new goals.
The workings of institutional bricolage are readily apparent in the following
description of the means by which the Gaddis ﬁnd grass and fodder during the
winter months. Drawing on overlapping legal and normative repertoires and
switching between identities, it is possible for the shepherds to successfully
access pasture resources.
WINTER AND THE COOL SEASON
Maghar, Posh and Magh and Falgun (mid-November to mid-March)
Before the second half of the month of Kartik, the Saal valley shepherds move
down to their home villages where the ﬂocks stay in the now empty ﬁelds. They
remain for a week to ten days and are able to celebrate Diwali with their families.
Then, over a few days in the ﬁnal week of Kartik, the ﬂocks re-commence the
return journey to the Punjab borders.
The ﬁrst stage of the journey south begins just before sunset. From Baal
village the ﬂock is led down the hillside to reach the main road in what remains
of the day. Moving quickly, shepherds aim to cross Chamba town soon after
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midnight to avoid the worst of the trafﬁc and cross the bridge over the Ravi
River without disruption.42 By 3 a.m., Deso’s group reaches Mangal village on
the south bank of the Ravi and from here they follow the road that climbs up
over this relatively low part of the Dhaula Dhar range. By midday they are at
Ratiar where, with sheep, goats and shepherds exhausted, they rest beside a
dried-up riverbed until the next morning. ‘Anyone can stay here – permission
isn’t required as there is no forest and this place can’t be cultivated. But no one
stays for more than a day as there is less grazing [than elsewhere].’
Leaving the Chamba valley during the ﬁnal days of Kartik, the next stage of
the shepherds’ journey coincides with the start of the month of Maghar/Agahan
(mid-November). With ﬁve more days of journey before they reach their winter
grazing areas, typically Deso or Nidhia will get up early each morning and travel
ahead of the rest of the ﬂock trying to arrange grazing for the night. Local people
approach this ‘assami’ [friend] and negotiate for the goats and sheep to stay in
their ﬁelds. Though for Deso’s group the stopping points are pretty much ﬁxed
– Malkawal, Nurpur, Naga Bari and Bari Khed – they stay with different people
each year, depending on who wants their ﬁelds manured.
Most of the Saal valley ﬂocks, and many from elsewhere in Chamba, follow
the same route over the Dhaula Dhar via the pass at Jot. It is estimated that each
year over 200 ﬂocks will come this way, mostly within a few days of each other.
Having crossed the last barrier to the south, the ﬂocks fan out again, with some
going east towards Chintpurni, the Pong dam and Jawalamukhi, while others,
including the Saal valley shepherds, travel west for the forests around Malkawal,
Barnda, Kandwal and Chakki – an area broadly between Nurpur and Pathankot.
Though still within the borders of Himachal Pradesh, this area, stretching to
where the jungles of the Siwalik Hills ﬂatten out into agricultural plains, is
referred to as ‘Punjab’ by the shepherds. Marking the southernmost point of
their migration, the shepherds graze their ﬂocks in forest and ﬁelds here for the
next few months.
Bhensu Ram’s permit speciﬁes an area close to Chakki Bank as the customary
winter ban43 that may be used by his family for as long as they choose to continue
in shepherding. Upon arriving in ‘Punjab’, it is to their ban in the Chakki forest
that they head ﬁrst. In Deso’s words:
Now we have reached our permit land – from here to Chandrani up to
Chakki Bank. Another shepherd tried to come here but we chased him
away to the other side. . . . Local people also bring their animals to this
grazing land. This isn’t such a problem as they don’t have so many animals.
Actually for the village people it can be hard also as the Gaddi ﬂocks may
overgraze an area and leave them with nothing. We stay around here until
the end of March . . . It’s not enough but we make do.
42 The shepherds are concerned about the possibility of theft: ‘when we transfer the ﬂock it is
difﬁcult to cross the towns. A bus driver took three of our animals and then drove away’.
43 An area of forest used for grazing in the winter months.
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That local people are also able to enter the forest demonstrates once again that
customary rights are rarely exclusive. The people of several villages around
Chakki are able to graze their animals alongside with Deso’s ﬂock and claim
additional rights to other forest produce. As elsewhere, ‘herder rights are derived
from the forest settlements conducted by the British who ensured that herder
rights were not in any way made dependent upon the good will of the cultivator
village communities’ (Saberwal 2003, 218).
As we have seen, the shepherds are skilled at using informal arrangements to
avoid or modify ofﬁcial arrangements.44 However, this is not to say that they are
unable to tap into formal systems when it suits them in order to ensure that
beneﬁcial de jure arrangements are upheld. Non-nomadic graziers and local
farmers are not the only ones who want to gain full control over the Gaddis
traditional winter grazing grounds. In a ﬁne example of bricolage, Deso recalled
the events of a decade before when an industrial group had tried to build a
factory in an area that included the grazing runs of several shepherds.
Fences were put up and the shepherds told they could no longer enter. The
malundis [of the ﬂocks concerned] went to the pradhans and sarpanches [local
village headmen and ofﬁcials] and pointed out the problems that would
result from the [building] project. They all agreed to give their support.
Even the Forest Department had no objection and said they wouldn’t inter-
vene if shepherds encroached onto the closed land.
Faced with documented ‘traditional rights’ granted during the colonial period
and conﬁrmed by the Forest Department, the land usurpers were forced to back
down. Despite this victory, Deso and others are worried about future encroach-
ment. Hari Singh, the malundi of another of the Panj La ﬂocks, asked rhetorically
‘how can I stand in the court looking like this? . . . Where can we get the money
to ﬁght?’ Though the Gaddis prefer to avoid legal action, this doesn’t mean that
they may not undertake it quite successfully given the right circumstances.45
Over time the Gaddis have proved to be surprisingly adept at manipulating the
political process to gain inﬂuence in the corridors of power. As a scheduled tribe,
and a relatively uniﬁed ‘vote bank’, the political clout of the Gaddi community
should not go unrecognized as a means by which they may gain improvements
in access to forage (see Saberwal 2003, 214).
Despite Deso’s claim to stay at Chakki ban until March, competing interests
and tenurial complexity mean that ﬁnding grazing over the four winter months
is considerably more problematic. Prithu’s family hold additional ‘customary
rights’ to graze an area of forest close to Chakki, hence easily accessible. But
even the two bans combined cannot provide sufﬁcient grazing for the entire
winter.
44 See also Saberwal (1999, chapter 4) for details of the Gaddi shepherds’ attempts at avoiding Forest
Department control.
45 I was later to learn that despite his complaints Hari Singh had been an enthusiastic litigant on at
least two previous occasions.
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In contrast to the summers spent in Lahoul, in winter most groups of shep-
herds split up into smaller groups in order to ﬁnd adequate pasturage. Additional
labour is required to tend the ﬂocks, especially as the proximity of cultivated
ﬁelds requires stricter control over sheep and (especially) goats. During these
months, two or three other part-time shepherds, including Deso’s brother Nandlal,
will come down from the Saal valley to assist Deso, Bir, Nidhia, Prithu, Mohinder
and Dimu in their work. The big summer herd is split into smaller groups of
about 100–150. Doing so reduces the damage caused to the trees and grass at any
one location. Each day the animals are further sub-divided, with sheep separated
from goats, and the young from the adults, allowing the shepherds to meet their
animals’ different needs and eating requirements.46 With their permit ban of inad-
equate size to provide pasture for the full winter, these smaller groups must
spread out onto lands formally held under a variety of other tenurial regimes.
Aside from the permit forest, a second source of pasture is found in farmers’
ﬁelds. Based on research in Rajasthan, Robbins describes an increasing incidence
of contractual grazing relations on fallow land ‘[t]hese contracts, while not written,
are fairly formal and exclusive . . . Individual households now contract to graze
on the land of large holders for a speciﬁed period each year’ (2001, 208). Similar
unwritten but formal contracts seem to characterize relations between Gaddis
and the jamindars (landowners) of the Punjab border region. In this area of
Himachal the agricultural calendar involves a main crop of maize which is
planted in April and harvested in October; after this, the ﬁelds are either planted
with wheat or vegetables, or simply left fallow. The shepherds are able to
exploit this fallow period as follows:
We stay in the same jamindars’ ﬁelds every year, as did our forefathers. To
some we give manure and to some we have to pay. This arrangement is
based on conﬁdence and they keep the ﬁelds free for us only . . . Up to
Lohri [a festival held in mid January] the farmers grow wheat so the ﬂock
stays in the empty vegetable ﬁelds. After Lohri when the wheat is cut then
we move to the empty ﬁelds. When the maize is ready to be planted then
we move back up to the hills.
Deso has developed a similar arrangement with three or four farmers,47 one of
whom, named Karanjit, told me: ‘every year they come to Suliari . . . My family
have known Deso’s family for a long time’. The ﬂock is rotated through Karanjit’s
ﬁelds over three or four days, leaving behind valuable animal droppings: ‘the shit
is better [than commercial fertilizers] and lasts for three years. Fertilizer has to
be put down every year and the land gets degraded if you stop; [it’s like] the land
becomes addicted’. What is interesting in this case is that Deso only stays for one
year out of every two. Deso shares the use of Karanjit’s charan (private grazing)
and ﬁelds with another shepherd from Panj La: ‘one year Des Raj comes to
46 Fodder for the goats is produced by carefully cutting branches from trees with a sickle; sheep
feed on grass.
47 Described as mitra (friends).
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Suliari but the next year Bhagtu and Kunial will use my land – the two take it
in turns. They do this because they are both from the same village and keep
good relations.’ Deso says this arrangement developed from a time when his
father travelled with Bhagtu. Since splitting, the increased size of their respective
ﬂocks grew too great for them to use the ﬁelds simultaneously, so they agreed
to take it in turns to go there.
While not so long ago this exchange of droppings for pasture was considered
a fairly equitable arrangement, recent decades have seen farmers increasingly
making demands for payments from shepherds wanting to stay on their land.
‘Some amount has always been paid but it was much less before. Payment has
increased a lot in the last ﬁve to ten years.’ Nidhia remembers when shepherds
would be fed each night and, in return, they might help with tasks such as fence
building: ‘we used to get rice and dal from the farmers, but now we have to give
them money to stay on their ﬁelds’. Deso estimates that the group pays to
farmers around Rs. 5000 to obtain adequate fodder and pasture during the four
months they must stay in Punjab. A conversation with Hari Singh revealed the
reason behind this extra expense:
R.A. ‘Why do farmers now charge for shepherds to use their ﬁelds?’
H.S. ‘Farmers know that there is less pasture nowadays and that shepherds
have no alternative but to use their ﬁelds. One shepherd goes and
offers 100 rupees, then another says that they will pay 200 rupees
and so the price rises. It is only in places where only one or two
shepherds go that the use of ﬁelds for pasture costs nothing.’
R.A. ‘But the farmers also need the shepherds’ ﬂocks to provide fertilizer
for their ﬁelds, don’t they?’
H.S. ‘It is more important for shepherds to get grazing than it is for the
farmers to get dung.’
These answers raise a number of important points. Hari Singh makes clear, in a
refrain popular among the shepherds, that ‘ajkal jangal gaya’ (these days the
jungle has disappeared). The expansion of cultivation is frequently suggested as
a factor in the decline of the Gaddis’ system of mobile pastoralism. However, as
the above example show, fallow ﬁelds have developed into an acceptable alter-
native to jungle grazing. If prices for grazing in these ﬁelds have increased48 it
should also be remembered that the commercialization of pastoral production
and a dramatic rise in the price of meat provides the means through which it can
be paid (see Axelby 2005, chapter 3).
Payment for pasture is not limited to farmers’ ﬁelds. Surprisingly, the Forest
Department is also willing to lease areas of forest to shepherds for grazing even
where the shepherds have no customary right of use. Arrangements may also be
struck in those areas of village forest to which the shepherds have no traditional
right of access. ‘The permit land is our own to use but outside our permit land
48 Paying for fodder plus the necessary bribes and penalties costs around 40–60 rupees per animal
for the winter (4000–6000 rupees for a ﬂock of 100).
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we have to ask the panchayat to use forest for gazing.’ Where villagers hold
common rights to an area of forest, the shepherds have to come to some ﬁnancial
agreement with the relevant village council before they can enter. ‘Trini [paid to
the F.D.] is for the land, but the grass and fodder belongs to the panchayat so we
have to buy this from them.’ Sometimes a panchayat will hold an auction and
shepherds will compete to gain access. Reaching agreement with the panchayat
ensures an additional supply of grazing, though this may be circumscribed by
local rules regarding when the pastureland can be accessed and how long the
shepherds can stay there. Payments to panchayats are likely to amount to several
thousand rupees to gain one month’s grazing. Finally, though few would admit
that they do it themselves, many shepherds describe how other groups are
known to enter reserved or restricted forests illegally, often bribing low-level
Forest Department ofﬁcials in order to do so.
Given the relatively small size of ‘permit’ forest and the high cost of accessing
alternative grazing, whether from farmers, village panchayats or the Forest
Department, ﬁnding adequate winter grazing has long been a struggle for shep-
herds. Fortunately, in recent times, an alternative source of grazing has become
available and the shepherds, ever alert to recognize a new opportunity, have been
quick to exploit this. In descriptions of the legal changes introduced by the
British in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the nationalization of forest
and rigid attachment of areas of ‘waste’ to local villages are often (and rightly)
described as complicating the Gaddis’ search for pasture and fodder. In particular,
the privatization of land ownership is seen as having encouraged the expansion
of cultivation and greatly reduced the land available to the shepherds’ ﬂocks.
What has received less attention is how many of these legal changes created new
avenues through which migratory shepherds could enter grazing land. Noble
(1987, 164) suggests that it is likely that some Gaddi families already had a
toehold in this part of Kangra before these changes. However, since the time of
settlement, these Gaddi holdings have certainly increased. Protected from the
competition of non-agricultural groups49 and able to quickly convert their ﬂocks
into cash, over the last century the Gaddis have been successful in purchasing
much additional land in the area south of the Dhaula Dhar range. Prithu’s family
is one that took advantage of the gradual drift south:
Anyone can buy land in Punjab, but only Himachali people can buy land
in Himachal. Twenty-two years ago we bought this land – we have eight
bigha on which we grow wheat, corn, rice and blackbeans. It’s nice to have
a home here. Many Gaddis bought houses in the plains area 30 or 40 years
ago – it’s much more comfortable. Nowadays my chacha [father’s younger
49 Following the creation of a market for land in the late nineteenth century, concerns were raised
about the possibility of wealthy outsiders tricking local farmers out of their holdings. In response, the
Punjab Alienation of Land Act of 1900 prohibited members of castes classiﬁed as ‘non-agricultural’
from buying land from ‘agricultural castes’. What was intended to discourage money lending and
parasitic landlordism proved to be a great boon for the Gaddis who were among those castes deﬁned
as ‘agricultural’.
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brother] lives here mostly [rather than in Sarahan in the Saal valley]. My
older brother and father also come here for some time in the winter. The
ﬂock can also graze [on our ﬁelds] here for about a week.
The advantages of owning land in Kangra are two-fold. For a week in mid-
December, the sheep are penned in the ﬁelds belonging to Prithu’s family to
provide manure for the wheat crop planted at the end of the month. Addition-
ally, and more signiﬁcantly, local residency allows the Gaddis to access grazing
that land settlement, and in particular the nineteenth-century creation of co-
proprietary bodies over shamelat (village common pastures), were supposed to
have denied to them. The attraction of buying land around this area is more than
just the acquisition of a plot to build on or to cultivate (Noble 1987). For the
shepherds the real advantage is that ownership of cultivated land brings with it
rights over adjacent areas of waste. Land ownership entitles Prithu’s family to a
co-proprietor’s right to use the panchayat or village forests. The combination of
Deso’s and Prithu’s claims to permit grazing at Chakki, the use of farmers’ ﬁelds
and access to village common land around Barnda ensures an adequate supply of
fodder and grazing to feed the ﬂock for the winter months.
Chait (mid-March to mid-April)
The beginning of spring completes this account of the annual migration cycle of
a typical Gaddi ﬂock. At the start of the month the Saal valley shepherds can be
found grazing their ﬂocks in the winter pastures between Pathankot and Nurpur.
Two or three weeks later, as the hot weather begins to move in, they leave their
winter bans and start moving north. Usually the ﬂocks will stop for a day or so
around Jessor, Nurpur, Chawari and Dharmsal before crossing the Dhaula Dhar
range at Basodhan Jot at the end of the month. The journey takes around 10 days
in all, allowing the shepherds to return to their home villages soon after the start
of Baisakh (late April). When I asked Deso which is the best of the locations he
visits each year, he replied: ‘where there is grass I am happiest. It is according to
the season, that’s why we move’.
Gaddi Bricoleurs
This review of how a group of Gaddi shepherds gains access to grazing resources
over the course of a migration cycle reveals a wide variety of ways in which the
shepherds interact with the state. First there are attempts to deal with the state
in relatively formal ways, approaching it to claim due entitlements, for example
petitioning to ensure adequate alternatives are provided when grazing land is
closed or demanding redress in cases where farmers have encroached onto permit
pasture. Second, the state can also be approached in more informal ways: I have
already described incidences of bribery and informal contacts with agents of the
state. Finally there is avoidance and deceit, which takes the form of manipulation
or withholding of information, illegal trespass, avoiding checks and so on.
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Just as relations with the state are not simple or one sided, so the institutional
arrangements by which shepherds manage pasture resources exhibit a degree of
complexity. Applying Cleaver’s concept of institutional bricolage – borrowing
from different institutions at different times according to current position –
allows for an understanding of pasture use and management in contemporary
Himachal Pradesh as an intricate blend of formal and informal, traditional and
modern. In this respect, rather than confrontation and a simple choice of indi-
vidual vs collective management regimes, it seems that communal arrangements
have survived and evolved as part of a somewhat messy process of negotiation,
ﬂuctuation and borrowing and hence is ultimately ‘shaped by individuals acting
within the bounds of circumstantial constraint’ (Cleaver 2002, 17).
CONCLUSION: RETHINKING AGENCY AND STRUCTURE ON THE 
COMMONS
In ‘new traditionalist’ discourse, agency is recognized in the form of popular
initiatives that attempt to ‘repudiate modernity and recover tradition’ (Sinha
et al. 1997, 67). Similarly, in CPR theory, reactions to Hardin’s ‘tragedy’ scenario
have tended to polarize and oppose local communities to the actions of states.
Commenting on the relentless promotion of private and state ownership,
Ostrom et al. describe how, ‘in many countries, two centuries of colonisation
followed by state-run development policy that affected some CPRs has produced
great resistance to externally imposed institutions’ (1999, 281). A consequence is
that attention has generally focused on the strategies employed by supposedly
undifferentiated communities to preserve local institutions and traditional sys-
tems. The ‘thin’ rationality apparent in Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’ posi-
tion has been challenged by a thicker notion of rationality in which communal
context is properly acknowledged. While rejecting the narrow determinism of
Hardin’s model we must be wary of falling into a similar limiting framework in
which the solutions to commons dilemmas spring from homogeneous commu-
nities of resource users acting rationally in a vacuum. Though recognizing the
possibility of agency, this position still seems somewhat limited in its character-
ization of the ability of local people to determine outcomes; the use of the term
‘resistance’ suggests a defensive or obstructive stance. With the agency of local
actors seemingly limited to the retention or recovery of tradition, other aspects
of their encounters with states and markets are overlooked. In emphasizing con-
servation, maintenance and resistance, these positions fail to recognize the ability
of local people, working alone or in concert with others, to create new forms
and respond in positive ways to changes in context. ‘Commons’ may well be
embedded in local social systems but, as the Gaddi example shows, it would
be a mistake to view these systems as undifferentiated, static or unaffected by
external events and processes.
While conventional examinations of property regimes often deny the co-
existence of multiple ownership types, a looser understanding of the roles,
identities and goals of resource users is better able to explain the complicated
72 Richard Axelby
© 2007 The Author.
Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Henry Bernstein and Terence J. Byres.
Journal of Agrarian Change, Vol. 7 No. 1, January 2007, pp. 35–75.
outcomes found in the real world. When it comes to property arrangements, all
actors (state or community, local, national or international) assume multiple
identities, play multiple roles and recognize different classiﬁcations of resources
and of resource users. Far from being ﬁxed and stable, the varied institutions
which play a role in shaping access are often ﬂexible and subject to negotiation.
Taking this multidimensional view of property access determination – of variable
and shifting forces capable of operating at different levels – entails recognizing
the possibility that systems of ‘common’ use and control of resources, rather
than limited to some stable and isolated ideal, are capable of operating in a wide
variety of settings. ‘External’ forces may subject existing local property systems
to considerable stress, but this is not to say that they inevitably displace or
replace them so that they disappear. Outcomes are determined through the inter-
action of different local and external dynamics and competition between differ-
ent claims and claimants.
Contrary to the standard alternative position, it is argued here that acceptance
of, and adjustment to, change are much more typical of local responses than any
simple opposition. In limiting agency to resistance, the ‘new traditionalists’
ignore the more creative outcomes of interactions between the state and local
people. Commons users employ a variety of responses in the face of externally
induced change; they are capable of more than covert resistance and outright
opposition to change. Local agency operates anywhere along a continuum from
armed uprising to willing acceptance of change with various possibilities and
practices of mutual adjustment and adaptation between these extremes. This
article has presented and explored a case in which communal user groups have
proved capable of ensuring the long-term survival of common property man-
agement in the modern age, through adjustment and adaptation rather than a
return to tradition. Instead of looking at (or for) ‘resistance’ alone, it is important
to view agency as an ongoing process of engagement and adaptation, sometimes
positive, sometimes negative, but never one-sided or simple.
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